Crisis and escalation in cyberspace /
| Основен автор: | Libicki, Martin C. |
|---|---|
| Формат: | Електронна книга |
| Език: | English |
| Публикувано: |
Santa Monica, CA :
Rand, Project Air Force,
2012.
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| Предмети: | |
| Онлайн достъп: |
An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view |
| Подобни документи: |
Print version::
Crisis and escalation in cyberspace. |
Съдържание:
- Avoiding crises by creating norms
- Narratives, dialogues, and signaling
- Escalation management
- Strategic stability
- Conclusions and recommendations for the Air Force
- Introduction
- Some hypothetical crises
- Mutual mistrust is likely to characterize a cyber crisis
- States may have room for maneuver in a cyber crisis
- A note on methodology
- Purpose and organization
- Avoiding crises by creating norms
- What kind of norms might be useful?
- Enforce laws against hacking
- Disassociate from freelance hackers
- Discourage commercial espionage
- Be careful about the obligation to suppress cyber traffic
- How do we enforce norms?
- Confidence-building measures
- Norms for victims of cyberattacks
- Norms for war?
- Deception
- Military necessity and collateral damage
- Proportionality
- Reversibility
- Conclusions
- Narratives, dialogue, and signals
- Narratives to promote control
- A narrative framework for cyberspace
- Victimization, attribution, retaliation, and aggression
- Victimization
- Attribution
- Retaliation
- Aggression
- Emollients: narratives to walk back a crisis
- We did nothing
- Well, at least not on our orders
- It was an accident
- This is nothing new
- At least it does not portend anything
- Broader considerations
- Signals
- Ambiguity in signaling
- Signaling resolve
- Signaling that cyber combat is not kinetic combat
- Conclusions
- Escalation management
- Motives for escalation
- Does escalation matter?
- Escalation risks
- Escalation risks in phase
- Escalation risks for contained local conflicts
- Escalation risks for uncontained conflicts
- Managing proxy cyberattacks
- What hidden combatants imply for horizontal escalation
- Managing overt proxy conflict
- The difficulties of tit-for-tat management
- The importance of pre-planning
- Disjunctions among effort, effect, and perception
- Inadvertent escalation
- Escalation into kinetic warfare
- Escalation into economic warfare
- Sub rosa escalation
- Managing the third-party problem
- The need for a clean shot
- Inference and narrative
- Command and control
- Commanders
- Those they command
- Conclusions
- Implications for strategic stability
- Translating sources of cold war instability to cyberspace
- What influence can cyberwar have if nuclear weapons exist?
- Can cyberwar disarm another state's nuclear capabilities?
- Can cyberwar disarm another states cyberwarriors?
- Does cyberwar lend itself to alert-reaction cycles?
- Are cyberdefenses inherently destabilizing?
- Would a cyberspace arms races be destabilizing?
- Misperception as a source of crisis
- Side takes great exception to cyberespionage
- Defenses are misinterpreted as preparations for war
- Too much confidence in attribution
- Too much confidence in or fear of pre-emption
- Supposedly risk-free cyberattacks
- Neutrality
- Conclusions
- Can cyber crises be managed?
- A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks
- B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses
- Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks?
- Bibliography
- Figures
- Figure 1: Alternative postures for a master cyber narrative
- Figure 2: Sources of imprecision in tit for tat
- Figure 3: An inadvertent path to mutual escalation
- Figure A-1: Configuring networks to limit the damage of DDoS attacks
- Table
- Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses.