Mental reality /
"In Mental reality, Galen Strawson argues that much contemporary philosophy of mind gives undue primacy of place to publicly observable phenomena, nonmental phenomena, and behavioral phenomena (understood as publicly observable phenomena) in its account of the nature of mind. It does so at the...
| Основен автор: | Strawson, Galen, (Author) |
|---|---|
| Формат: | Електронна книга |
| Език: | English |
| Публикувано: |
Cambridge, Mass. :
MIT Press,
℗♭2010.
|
| Издание: | 2nd ed., with a new appendix. |
| Серия: |
Representation and mind.
|
| Предмети: | |
| Онлайн достъп: |
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=291856 |
| Подобни документи: |
Print version::
Mental reality. |
Съдържание:
- 1
- Introduction
- 1.1
- Default position
- 1.2
- Experience
- 1.3
- The character of experience
- 1.4
- Understanding-experience
- 1.5
- Note about dispositional mental states
- 1.6
- Purely experiential content
- 1.7
- Account of four seconds of thought
- 2
- Three questions
- 2.1
- Introduction
- 2.2
- Mental and the nonmental
- 2.3
- Mental and the publicly observable
- 2.4
- Mental and the behavioral
- 2.5
- Neobehaviorism and reductionism
- 2.6
- Naturalism in the philosophy of mind
- 2.7
- Conclusion: The three questions
- 3
- Agnostic materialism, part 1
- 3.1
- Introduction
- 3.2
- Monism
- 3.3
- Linguistic argument
- 3.4
- Materialism and M & P monism
- 3.5
- Comment on reduction
- 3.6
- Impossibility of an "objective phenomenology"
- 3.7
- Asymmetry and reduction
- 3.8
- Equal-status monism
- 3.9
- Panpsychism
- 3.10
- Inescapability of metaphysics
- 4
- Agnostic materialism, part 2
- 4.1
- Ignorance
- 4.2
- Sensory spaces
- 4.3
- Experience, explanation, and theoretical integration
- 4.4
- Hard part of the mind-body problem
- 4.5
- Neutral monism and agnostic monism
- 4.6
- Comment on eliminativism, instrumentalism, and so on
- 4.7
- Conclusion
- 5
- Mentalism, idealism, and immaterialism
- 5.1
- Introduction
- 5.2
- Mentalism
- 5.3
- Strict or pure process idealism
- 5.4
- Active-principle idealism
- 5.5
- Stuff idealism
- 5.6
- Immaterialism
- 5.7
- Positions restated
- 5.8
- Dualist options
- 5.9
- Summary
- 5.10
- Frege's thesis
- 5.11
- Objections to pure process idealism
- 5.12
- Problem of mental dispositions
- 6
- 'Mental'
- 6.1
- Introduction
- 6.2
- Shared abilities?
- 6.3
- Sorting ability
- 6.4
- Definition of 'mental being'
- 6.6
- Mental phenomena
- 6.7
- View that all mental phenomena are experiential phenomena
- 7
- Natural intentionality
- 7.1
- Introduction
- 7.2
- E/C intentionality
- 7.3
- Experienceless
- 7.4
- Intentionality and abstract and nonexistent objects
- 7.5
- Experience, purely experiential content, and N/C intentionality
- 7.6
- Concepts in nature
- 7.7
- Intentionality and experience
- 7.8
- Summary with problem
- 7.9
- Conclusion
- 8
- Pain and 'pain'
- 8.1
- Introduction
- 8.2
- Neobehaviorist view
- 8.3
- Linguistic argument for the necessary connection between pain and behavior
- 8.4
- Challenge
- 8.5
- Sirians
- 8.6
- N.N.'s novel
- 8.7
- Objection to the Sirians
- 8.8
- Betelgeuzians
- 8.9
- Point of the Sirians
- 8.10
- Functionalism, naturalism, and realism about pain
- 8.11
- Unpleasantness and qualitative character
- 9
- Weather watchers
- 9.1
- Introduction
- 9.2
- Rooting story
- 9.3
- What is it like to be a weather watcher?
- 9.4
- Aptitudes of mental states
- 9.5
- Argument from the conditions for possessing the concept of space
- 9.6
- Argument from the conditions for language ability
- 9.7
- Argument from the nature of desire
- 9.8 Desire and affect
- 9.9
- Argument from the phenomenology of desire
- 10
- Behavior
- 10.1
- Introduction
- 10.2
- Hopeless definition
- 10.3
- Difficulties
- 10.4
- Other-observability
- 10.5
- Neo-neobehaviorism
- 11
- Concept of mind.