Monitoring democracy : when international election observation works, and why it often fails /
In recent decades, governments and NGOs--in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world--have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessment...
| Основен автор: | Kelley, Judith G. |
|---|---|
| Формат: | Електронна книга |
| Език: | English |
| Публикувано: |
Princeton :
Princeton University Press,
2012.
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| Предмети: | |
| Онлайн достъп: |
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=439322 |
| Подобни документи: |
Print version::
Monitoring Democracy : When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails. |
Съдържание:
- Cover; Contents; Illustrations; Tables; Preface; Abbreviations; PART I; CHAPTER 1: Introduction; Two Questions; Methods of Analysis; CHAPTER 2: The Rise of a New Norm; The Changing Normative Environment; Contestation; Increased Supply and Demand; The Popularization of Monitoring; Monitoring Today: Organizational Variation; Summary; CHAPTER 3: The Shadow Market; Disagreements about Contested Elections; Who Invites Whom?; Discussion; CHAPTER 4: What Influences Monitors' Assessments?; Analyzing Summary Monitor Assessments; Five Types of Bias; Discussion.
- CHAPTER 5: Do Politicians Change Tactics to Evade Criticism?What Constitutes Evidence of a Monitor-Induced Shift?; What Are the Safer Forms of Cheating?; Data: The Varieties of Irregularities; The Record; Discussion; PART II; CHAPTER 6: International Monitors as Reinforcement; Altering Incentives to Cheat; Altering Domestic Conditions; If It Works, When Should It Work?; Summary; CHAPTER 7: Are Monitored Elections Better?; Measures of Election Quality; An Overview of the Record; Statistical Analysis; Discussion; CHAPTER 8: Long-Term Effects; Selection of Countries and Method of Analysis.
- Do International Monitors Improve Elections Over Time?When Do Countries Follow the Recommendations of International Monitors?; Discussion; CONCLUSION: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly; Do Monitors Assess Elections Accurately and Objectively?; Do Monitors Improve the Quality of Elections?; Closing Thoughts; Appendix A: Data Description; Two Datasets; Variables; Appendix B: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 3; Appendix C: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 4; Dependent Variable; Analysis; Appendix D: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 7; Additional Description of Matching Process.
- Appendix E: Case SummariesAlbania: The Importance of Leverage; Armenia: Paper Compliance; Bangladesh: Slowly but Surely?; Bulgaria: Motivated but Slow; El Salvador: International Meddling for Both Good and Bad; Georgia: Not So Rosy; Guyana: Uphill Battle; Indonesia: A Sluggish Behemoth; Kenya: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back; Lesotho: Deadlock; Mexico: Constructive Engagement; Nicaragua: Excessive Meddling and Deal Making; Panama: Both a Will and a Way; Russia: Goliath Beats David; South Africa: Remarkably Unremarkable; Notes; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P.
- Qr; s; t; u; v; w; y; z.