Free will as an open scientific problem /
This work presents an argument that the problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events.
| Основен автор: | Balaguer, Mark. |
|---|---|
| Формат: | Електронна книга |
| Език: | English |
| Публикувано: |
Cambridge, Mass. :
MIT Press,
℗♭2010.
|
| Предмети: | |
| Онлайн достъп: |
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=291788 |
| Подобни документи: |
Print version::
Free will as an open scientific problem. |
Съдържание:
- Introduction. Formulating the problem of free will
- Some remarks on libertarianism
- Synopsis of the book
- Why the compatibilism issue and the conceptual-analysis issue are metaphysically irrelevant. Introduction
- What determines whether an answer to the what-is-free-will question is correct?
- Why the what-is-free-will question is irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will question, assuming the OL view is correct
- Why the what-is-free-will question is irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will question, even if the OL view isn't correct
- Why the compatibilism question reduces to the what-is-free-will question
- Where we stand and where we're going next
- An aside : some remarks on the what-is-free-will question, the compatibilism question, and the moral responsibility question
- Why the libertarian question reduces to the issue of indeterminacy. Introduction
- Preliminaries
- The argument
- Non-torn decisions
- Where we stand
- Why there are no good arguments for or against determinism (or any other thesis that would establish or refute libertarianism). Introduction
- An a priori argument for determinism (and, hence, against TDW-indeterminism)?
- An a priori argument for libertarianism (and, hence, in favor of TDW-indeterminism)?
- Empirical arguments?
- Where we stand.