Moral hazard does IMF financing encourage imprudence by borrowers and lenders? /
"The argument that IMF financing creates moral hazard cannot be lightly dismissed. From the outset, this pamphlet recognizes that, to the extent IMF-supported programs try to contain the total economic costs of financial crises, some element of moral hazard - a greater willingness of creditors...
| Основни автори: | Lane, Timothy D. 1955- (Author), Phillips, Steven, 1961- (Author) |
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| Автор-организации: | International Monetary Fund. External Relations Department. |
| Формат: | Електронен |
| Език: | English |
| Публикувано: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
2002.
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| Серия: |
Economic issues (International Monetary Fund) ;
28. |
| Предмети: | |
| Онлайн достъп: |
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=449600 |
| Подобни документи: |
Print version::
Moral hazard. |
| Онлайн достъп от Библиотека ”Паница” на Американския университет в България: |
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=449600 |
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| Провери в Paniza Library, AUBG | Сигнатура: |
HC60 .L311 2002eb |
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