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Moral hazard does IMF financing encourage imprudence by borrowers and lenders? /

"The argument that IMF financing creates moral hazard cannot be lightly dismissed. From the outset, this pamphlet recognizes that, to the extent IMF-supported programs try to contain the total economic costs of financial crises, some element of moral hazard - a greater willingness of creditors...

Пълно описание

Основни автори: Lane, Timothy D. 1955- (Author), Phillips, Steven, 1961- (Author)
Автор-организации: International Monetary Fund. External Relations Department.
Формат: Електронен
Език: English
Публикувано: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, 2002.
Серия: Economic issues (International Monetary Fund) ; 28.
Предмети:
International Monetary Fund > Evaluation.
International Monetary Fund.
Economic assistance > Developing countries.
Debts, External > Developing countries.
Loans, Foreign > Developing countries.
Country risk > Developing countries.
Moral hazard > Developing countries.
Aide au developpement economique regional.
Dettes exterieures > Pays en voie de developpement.
Pre‚ts etrangers > Pays en voie de developpement.
Risque pays.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Development > Business Development.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Development > Economic Development.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Development > General.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Government & Business.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Structural Adjustment.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Public Policy > Economic Policy.
Evaluation.
Country risk.
Debts, External.
Economic assistance.
Loans, Foreign.
Moral hazard.
Buitenlandse schulden.
Ethiek.
Kredietverlening.
IMF.
Developing countries.
Electronic books.
Онлайн достъп: http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=449600
Подобни документи: Print version:: Moral hazard.
Резюме: "The argument that IMF financing creates moral hazard cannot be lightly dismissed. From the outset, this pamphlet recognizes that, to the extent IMF-supported programs try to contain the total economic costs of financial crises, some element of moral hazard - a greater willingness of creditors and debtors to take risks of such crises - is, in principle, an unavoidable consequence. But the key question, rather than a matter of presence or absence, is the degree of moral hazard. The most basic evidence, even in the case of countries that are supposed to be too big to fail, refutes the most extreme hypothesis - that investors believe they have a full guarantee from the IMF in the event of a financial crisis."--Preface.
Описание на библ. документ: "This Economic Issue is based on IMF Working Paper WP/00/168, 'Does IMF financing result in moral hazard?', October 2000"--Page iii.
Физически характеристики: 1 online resource (v, 15 pages) : illustrations.
Формат: Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
ISBN: 9781451935219
1451935218
ISSN: 1020-5098 ;

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