Competition among exchanges and enforcement policy
"In this paper, we explore how competition among stock exchanges, operated as self-regulatory organizations (SROs), affects the design of their members' surveillance. We develop a model where two for-profit SROs compete for trading volume, while brokers execute transactions on behalf of th...
| Основни автори: | Caglio, Cecilia, (Author), Pescatori, Andrea, (Author) |
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| Формат: | Електронен |
| Език: | English |
| Публикувано: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
℗♭2013.
|
| Серия: |
IMF working paper ;
WP/13/37. |
| Предмети: | |
| Онлайн достъп: |
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=548054 |
| Резюме: |
"In this paper, we explore how competition among stock exchanges, operated as self-regulatory organizations (SROs), affects the design of their members' surveillance. We develop a model where two for-profit SROs compete for trading volume, while brokers execute transactions on behalf of the investors and may misreport the true cash flow. The SROs can deter a fraud by announcing an investigation and imposing a monetary penalty. The success of the investigation depends upon both the amount of resources devoted to monitoring and the efficiency of monitoring technologies. We show that when contracts are incomplete and investors do not have perfect information about the monitoring efficiency, competition among exchanges induces a race to the bottom in enforcement policy and a reduction in total welfare, compared to the case of a monopolist SRO"--Abstract. |
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| Описание на библ. документ: |
Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed Feb. 11, 2013). "Prepared by Cecilia Caglio and Andrea Pescatori"--Page 2 of pdf. "Research Department"--Page 2 of pdf. "February 2013"--Page 2 of pdf. |
| Физически характеристики: |
1 online resource (31 pages) : color illustrations. |
| Библиография: |
Includes bibliographical references. |
| ISBN: |
9781475583700 1475583702 |