Competition among exchanges and enforcement policy
"In this paper, we explore how competition among stock exchanges, operated as self-regulatory organizations (SROs), affects the design of their members' surveillance. We develop a model where two for-profit SROs compete for trading volume, while brokers execute transactions on behalf of th...
| Основни автори: | Caglio, Cecilia, (Author), Pescatori, Andrea, (Author) |
|---|---|
| Формат: | Електронен |
| Език: | English |
| Публикувано: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
℗♭2013.
|
| Серия: |
IMF working paper ;
WP/13/37. |
| Предмети: | |
| Онлайн достъп: |
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=548054 |
Съдържание:
- Cover; Contents; I. The Model; A. Investors and Brokers; B. The SROs; C. The Timing; D. The Broker-Investor Contract: General Results; II. The Race to the Bottom; A. The Investor Problem; B. The Broker Problem; C. The SRO Problem and the Equilibrium; 1. The Monopolist Solution; III. Fraud and Market Participation; A. The Investor Problem; B. The Broker's misconduct; C. The SRO Problem and Equilibrium; 1. The Monopolist Solution under Incomplete Contracts; Tables; 1. Monopoly vs. Competition; IV. Extension: Sophisticated Investor; A. Homogenous Sophisticated investors; V. Conclusions.
- A. Appendix 1B. Appendix 2; 1. The SROs' Problem; 2. Naive vs Sophisticated; Figures.